Nature and perpetual peace in Kant and Fichte’s cosmopolitanism by Acosta, E. (Emiliano)
ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO 52/1 (2019) 87-111 87
ISSN: 0066-5215
DOI: 10.15581/009.52.1.87-111




Department of History, Archeology, Philosophy and Ethics
1050, Brussels (Bélgica)
emiliano.acosta@vub.be
Naturaleza y paz perpetua en el cosmopolitismo de Kant y Fichte
Abstract: This is a comparative study of the 
concept of nature in Kant and Fichte’s pro-
posals for perpetual peace. I will argue that 
Kant and Fichte’s ideas of perpetual peace 
present two very different ways of dealing 
with nature: whereas Kant’s proposal con-
sists of administrating the natural unsocia-
ble inclinations of human beings, departing 
from the assumption that the unsociable 
sociability of men is not only inherent to hu-
man nature but also the motor of the his-
torical progress of humanity, Fichte, on the 
contrary, advocates for a total repression 
of these inclinations, departing from the 
postulate that the historical progress of hu-
manity concerns exclusively the spiritual or 
intelligible dimension of human existence. 
Keywords: Perpetual peace; cosmopolitan-
ism; nature; providence.
Resumen: El presente artículo consiste 
en un estudio comparativo de la noción 
de naturaleza presente en las refl exiones 
de Kant y Fichte acerca de la paz perpetua. 
Se intentará mostrar que las ideas de Kant 
y Fichte acerca de la paz perpetua ofrecen 
dos modos distintos de tratar la naturaleza: 
mientras Kant propone, como medio para 
progresar hacia la paz perpetua, administrar 
la insociable sociabilidad del hombre, dado 
que, según sostiene, esta inclinación asocial 
y destructiva es inherente a la naturaleza 
humana, Fichte sugiere que la paz perpetua 
presupone, como medio para alcanzarla, la 
represión total de toda inclinación natural, 
entendiendo así que el progreso de la hu-
manidad no concierne a la naturaleza sino 
al espíritu. 
Palabras clave: Paz perpetua; cosmopoli-
tismo; naturaleza; providencia.
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I n what follows, I present a comparative study of Kant and Fichte’s views on the role and function of nature in their con-ceptions of perpetual peace.1 I will mainly focus on Kant’s essays 
“Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim” and “To-
ward Perpetual Peace” and on Fichte’s review of “Toward Perpetual 
Peace” and his book The Closed Commercial State. I will argue that 
Kant and Fichte’s ideas of perpetual peace offer two very different 
ways of dealing with nature: whereas Kant’s proposal consists of 
administrating the natural unsociable inclinations of human beings 
and departs from the assumption that the unsociable sociability of 
man is not only inherent to human nature but also the motor of the 
historical progress of humanity; Fichte, for his part, advocates for 
a total repression of these inclinations, departing from the hypoth-
eses that the natural egoism of man can be corrected through an 
ascetic transformation of culture and that the historical progress of 
humanity concerns exclusively the spiritual or intelligible dimen-
sion of human existence on earth. Contrary to both the specialized 
literature on Kant, which considers the issue of nature related to 
cosmopolitanism as confusing or irrelevant,2 and the Fichte-schol-
1. Following abreviations are used in the footnotes: “IUH” for I. KANT, Idea for a 
Universal History with the Cosmopolitan Aim, transl. by A. Wood, in A. OKSENBERG 
RORTY, J. SCHMIDT (eds.), Kant’s Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan 
Aim. A critical Guide (CUP, Cambridge, 2009) 9-23; TPP for I. KANT, Toward 
Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, transl. by D. Colclausure, in P. KLEINGELD 
(ed.), Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace and History (Yale 
University Press, New Heaven/London, 2006) 67-109; “IaG” for “Idee zu einer 
allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht”, “ZeF” for “Zum ewigen 
Frieden: Ein philosophischer Entwurf”, “RezPP” for Fichte’s review of Kant’s 
Perpetual Peace and “GHS” for Fichte’s The Closed Commercial State. The work of 
Kant is cited from the Akademie Ausgabe (from now on AA vol.: pp.): I. KANT, 
Gesammelte Schriften, vols. 1-22 ed. by the Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 
vol. 23 ed. by the Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, vol. 24ff. ed. 
by the Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Gö ttingen (DeGruyter, Berlin, 1900ff.). 
Fichte’s works are cited according to J. G. FICHTE, Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen 
Akademie der Wissenschaften (from now on GA series number/vol., pp.). E. FUCHS, 
R. LAUTH, H. JACOBS, H. GLIWITZKY (eds.) (Frommann-Holzboog, Stuttgart-
Bad Cannstatt, 1964-2012).
2. See, for instance, Ypi’s short but very clear overview of the different approachings 
to nature in the existing literature on Kant’s cosmopolitanism in L. YPI, Natura 
Daedala Rerum? On the Justifi cation of Historical Progress in Kant’s Guarantee of 
Perpetual Peace, “Kantian Review” 14-2 (2010) 118-119.
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arship, in which this issue still remains unattended,3 I will argue that 
these different views on nature are essential for understanding both 
philosophers’ conceptions of the political and economic situation 
needed for progressing towards the dreamed perpetual peace, since 
the way in which Kant and Fichte conceive nature, when dealing 
with cosmopolitanism and philosophy of history, conditions the way 
in which they describe the most perfect global community. Whereas 
Kant considers it as a strongly economic and political interdepend-
ence among states, Fichte thinks of perpetual peace as the result of 
an almost total cessation of international relations among states—
since Fichte’s radical protectionism allows, however, scientifi c and 
cultural international exchange.
I begin with an analysis of Kant’s concept of nature, legal cos-
mopolitanism, war and international trade from a cosmopolitan per-
spective and with a cosmopolitan aim, namely in their relation to his 
idea of perpetual peace (1), then I examine how these concepts are 
conceived and related to each other in Fichte’s mentioned works 
(2). In the last part (3), I offer as a conclusion some remarks on the 
conceptual differences between both philosophers.
1. KANT: NATURE AS GUARANTEE AND FACILITATOR OF HUMAN 
PROGRESS TOWARDS PERPETUAL PEACE
Certainly, one of the more intriguing things of Kant’s legal and po-
litical cosmopolitanism is the conception of nature that accompanies 
his cosmopolitan proposal. Both, in “Idea for a Universal History 
with a Cosmopolitan Aim” of 1784 and the 1795 essay “Toward 
Perpetual Peace”, Kant does not hesitate in identifying nature with 
3. See as an example of the indifference towards Fichte’s concept of nature in 
studies on his political writings I. NAKHIMOVSKY, The Closed Commercial State 
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2011). See for an overview of studies 
on Fichte’s concept of nature in general Traub’s detailed and well-documented 
research repport on Fichte’s concept of nature in H. TRAUB, Fichtes Begriff der 
Natur. Rezeptiongeschichte im Wandel - Ein Forschungsbericht, in H. GIRNDT (ed.), 
“Natur” in der Transzendentalphilosophie. Eine Tagung zum Gedenken an Reinhard 
Lauth (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 2015) 77-134.
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providence.4 This identifi cation, which, paraphrasing Spinoza, can 
be formulated as providentia sive natura, represents the main (regula-
tive) idea of his attempts at sketching, in both mentioned writings, 
a philosophy of history. According to Kant, the history of humanity 
consists of the accomplishment of a plan that nature has designed 
for the human species.5 Other ideas and concepts that we fi nd in 
these essays such as the teleological character of the existence of 
humankind on earth, the need of a republican form of government 
as well as of an international and cosmopolitan legal order for assur-
ing the cultural and moral progress of humanity and even the ideal 
of perpetual peace and the preliminary and defi nitive articles for a 
peace treaty are, therefore, subsidiary to this very peculiar concep-
tion of nature. As I argued elsewhere,6 the argumentative core of 
Kant’s idea of perpetual peace and legal cosmopolitanism resides 
in that big narrative about the historical destination of humanity. 
In this regard, it must not surprise us the fact that when Kant has 
to shortly defi ne his 1784 article, he calls it, not without reason, a 
“justifi cation of nature.”7
It is very well-known that in his article “Idea for a Universal 
History with a Cosmopolitan Aim”, Kant presents for the fi rst time 
to the German public his concept of legal cosmopolitanism.8 It is 
commonly assumed that the topic of legal cosmopolitanism rep-
resents the core of this essay. This is, to my view, the reason why 
Kant’s 1784 article on history has also commonly been considered 
as nothing but a fi rst attempt or a draft of the more elaborated the-
ory of legal cosmopolitanism, which he presented some years later 
in his essay “Toward Perpetual Peace.”9 However, a close reading of 
Kant’s 1784 article let us see that, despite of its relevance, legal cos-
4. IaG, AA 08:30; ZeF, AA 08:361.
5. IaG, AA 08:27.
6. E. ACOSTA and G. VAN DE VIJVER, While reading Kant’s Perpetual Peace, in D. 
PRAET (ed.), Philosophy of war and peace (VUBPress, Brussel, 2017) 131-144.
7. IUH 22 (IaG, AA 08:30).
8. IUH 16-17 (IaG, AA 08:24).
9. See P. KLEINGELD, Kant’s changing Cosmopolitanism, in A. OKSENBERG RORTY, 
J. SCHMIDT (eds.), Kant’s Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim. A 
Critical Guide (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009) 181-182.
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mopolitanism is not its central issue, but a concept, as I said above, 
subordinated to the real main topic of this article, namely, the idea 
of a plan of nature guiding human history.
If we, for instance, analyze the introduction and the nine prop-
ositions that make up this article, we will see that Kant discusses 
the possibility and benefi ts of legal cosmopolitanism only in two of 
the nine propositions, namely the seventh and the eighth proposi-
tion. Furthermore, at the beginning as well as at the end of the 
eighth proposition Kant makes his point perfectly clear about the, 
certainly, signifi cant, but still subordinated, systematic place of legal 
cosmopolitanism in his proposal for a universal history with a cos-
mopolitan aim. The eighth proposition reads as follows:
One can regard the history of the human species in the large 
as the completion of a hidden plan of nature to bring about an 
inwardly and, to this end, also an externally perfect state con-
stitution, as the only condition in which it can fully develop all 
its predispositions in humanity.10
And at the end of the eighth proposition we read:
Although this state body [sc. a federation of nations] for now 
stands before us only in the form of a very rough project, 
nevertheless already a feeling begins to stir in all members, 
each of which has an interest in the preservation of the whole; 
and this gives hope that after many transforming revolutions, 
in the end that which nature has as its aim will fi nally come 
about—a universal cosmopolitan condition, as the womb in 
which all original predispositions of the human species will 
be developed.11
In both quotes, legal cosmopolitanism does not appear as a goal in 
itself but rather as a condition or requirement for achieving the real 
10. IUH 19 (IaG, AA 08:27).
11. IUH 20-21 (IaG, AA 08:28).
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goal of humanity, the goal that nature has imposed to the human-
kind: the total development of all its original predispositions.
Moreover, as we can read in the above-quoted formulation of 
the eighth proposition, the argumentative connection between legal 
cosmopolitanism and the full development of human potentialities 
is actually mediated through the concept of a perfect nation-state 
constitution. Therefore, legal cosmopolitanism’s contribution to 
the progress of humanity essentially consists of guaranteeing the 
principal condition for this progress, namely the stability of the state 
of law in each country, which is required for peaceful interactions 
among citizens and, therefore, for the cultivation of the natural dis-
positions of the human species. In this regard, Kant considers legal 
cosmopolitanism as a condition of second degree, namely: a condi-
tion for the fi rst condition (the establishment of a rational national 
state constitution).
According to Kant, a rationally designed and established do-
mestic legal order that coercively organizes and disciplines the well-
known “unsociable sociability”12 is precisely that which the human 
species needs in order to achieve cultural progress. Only in this kind 
of politically structured civil society—that Kant compares with a 
“precinct [Gehege]”—human self-destructive antagonism brings 
forth its “best effect.”13 Nevertheless, the security that governments 
provide to citizens, is limited, since it only protects each individual 
freedom from the danger represented by the unsocial inclinations of 
the rest of civil society. As Kant observes, besides the menace that 
each citizen represents for the others, there are two other threats to 
citizen rights and consequently also to political stability and rule of 
law in a nation-state, namely: misuse or abuse of the power by the 
government14 and, naturally, war.15
Kant’s proposal of legal cosmopolitanism acts as an antidote 
against such abuses. On the one hand, international agreements and 
legislation regulating the relations among states and foreign citizens 
12. IUH 13 (IaG, AA 08:20).
13. IUH 15 (IaG, AA 08:22), see also IUH 18 (AA 08:25).
14. IUH 15 (IaG, AA 08:23).
15. IUH 16 (IaG, AA 08:24).
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will facilitate and promote world trade, the growth and intensifi -
cation of international commerce will function as an impediment 
for any possible infringement of civil freedom by national govern-
ments, since any violation of civil rights will necessarily result in a 
disadvantage for the economy of the respective state.16 On the other 
hand, not only the mentioned intensifi cation of international trade 
network will condition any future declaration of war,17 but also the 
effective reality of legal cosmopolitanism, namely the existence of 
an international institution with coercive power for regulating the 
relations among states, will guarantee that the nation that dares to 
attack one of the members of the federation of nations, will be pun-
ished by the other members.18
Accordingly, legal cosmopolitanism is not a goal in itself, but 
it rather appears within the argumentative structure of Kant’s 1784 
article on universal history as a concept subordinated to a set of 
presuppositions and propositions that Kant elaborates in order 
to show that human existence on earth has a meaning as well as 
a goal, namely the development of “all original predispositions of 
the human species.”19 In other words: Kant introduces the concept 
of legal cosmopolitanism exclusively as an answer to the question 
about the concrete actions that humanity has to take in order to 
achieve its own goal within the, as Kant calls it, “hidden plan of 
nature.”20
As we can read in Kant’s 1784 article, the concept of legal 
cosmopolitanism is directly related to a particular view of nature, 
human nature and its historicity. The main argument defending his 
proposal for the establishment of a federation of Nation-States is 
that without such a federation, fi rstly, the human species could not 
accomplish the goal that nature has imposed to humanity, secondly, 
there would be, consequently, germs and predispositions in nature, 
more specifi cally in the human species, that would not completely 
16. IUH 19-20 (IaG, AA 08:27).
17. IUH 20 (IaG, AA08:28).
18. IUH 18 (IaG, AA 08:26).
19. IUH 21 (IaG, AA 08:28).
20. IUH 19 (IaG, AA 08:27).
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develop, and hence, thirdly, we should conclude that nature would 
have produced something purposeless and absurd, what actually 
contradicts “the teleological doctrine of nature.”21 So, without the 
presupposition of the “hidden plan of nature” the claim about the 
need and benefi ts of an international legal order loses the rhetoric 
power that Kant certainly wanted to confer to his legal cosmopoli-
tanism in order to convince and mobilize politicians and world lead-
ers towards an enlightened and cosmopolitan way of understanding 
and practicing politics.22
In 1795, Kant presents the same hierarchical chain of condi-
tionality. In “Toward Perpetual Peace” Kant distinguishes three 
levels of law: ius civitatis, ius gentium and ius cosmopoliticum.23 Each 
level of law functions as a guarantee to the former. Kant does not 
consider them as goals in themselves, but as the legal instruments 
needed for constructing the best possible political scenario for both 
the total development of the human potentialities and the institu-
tional progress toward perpetual peace. According to Kant, these 
three law-levels are necessary only “in relation to the idea of per-
petual peace”.24 Like in 1784, Kant affi rms in 1795 that the need of 
a republican form of government as well as a federation of nations 
and the establishment of an international codex for protection of 
human rights is a requirement based in the natural social unsocia-
bility of man, a result of nature’s intervention in human history.25 
That Kant, in 1795, did not change his mind about the argumenta-
tive dependence of legal cosmopolitanism to his idea of nature as 
providence becomes still clearer in the “First Supplement”. Kant 
not only affi rms again that nature and providence are one and the 
same thing and provides for a more detailed analysis of the concept 
of providence,26 but also restates his 1784 thesis that human actions, 
and consequently the establishment of domestic and international 
21. IUH 11 (IaG, AA 08:18).
22. IUH 19-23 (IaG, AA 08: 27-31). See also ZeF, AA 08: 360, 361n. and 386.
23. ZeF, AA 08:349n.
24. Ibidem. See also ZeF, AA 08:365.
25. ZeF, AA 08: 352, 355, 360-361.
26. ZeF, AA 08:361n.
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institutions and regulations, are following, although without know-
ing it, a plan designed by the wisdom of nature.27 In this regard, 
it does not seem wrong to affi rm that Kant’s intervention in the 
18th-century debate on the problem of establishing a perfect civil 
constitution and on global justice goes beyond the limits of phi-
losophy of law and political economy and situates in the domains of 
anthropology and philosophy of history.
Kant’s idea of a hidden plan of nature entails a redefi nition 
of both nature and man. Nature, as I said above, is identifi ed with 
providence. This identifi cation implies not only that nature is guid-
ing human history but also that it wisely does so, since it knows what 
is good for humankind.28 Kant’s history of humanity does neither 
begin with nature’s revelation of this wisdom to man nor depends 
on a transference of knowledge, since within Kant’s big narrative 
about historical human progress, the reverse of nature’s wisdom is 
human ignorance:
Individual human beings and even whole nations think little 
about the fact [i.e. that there is a uniform uninterrupted course 
of history], since while each pursues its own aim in its own way 
and one often contrary to another, they are proceeding un-
noticed, as by a guiding thread, according to an aim of nature, 
which is unknown to them, and are laboring at its promotion, 
although even if it were to become known to them it would 
matter little to them.29
This description of human ignorance of the real aim of human ac-
tions at the very beginning of Kant’s 1784 article provides already a 
fi rst mention, though not totally explicit, of the “antagonism in so-
ciety”, namely the “social unsociability of human beings”, which Kant 
presents and analyzes in the fourth proposition of this essay.30 Kant 
never changed his mind about this topic in his later works: not only 
27. ZeF, AA 08:361.
28. IaG, AA 08:21; ZeF, AA 08:367-368.
29. IUH 10 (IaG, AA 08:17), see also ZeF, AA 08:365.
30. IUH 13 (IaG, AA 08:20).
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it appears again in 1795,31 but also at the end of his 1798 Anthro-
pology.32 As A. Wood, the English translator of Kant’s 1784 article, 
observes, we can read behind Kant’s formulation of human antago-
nism the statement of Michel de Montaigne that “there is nothing 
more unsociable than Man, and nothing more sociable: unsociable 
by his vice, sociable by his nature.”33 Despite of the value that this 
possible historiographical connection may have, I think that such 
a comparison actually does not explain anything of Kant’s social 
unsociability, but, on the contrary, functions as an impediment for 
understanding the originality of Kant’s view on the human nature.
According to Kant, the social unsociability does not refl ect a 
confl ict between vice and nature. Moreover, there is for him no 
duality in human nature, when it is considered with a cosmopolitan 
aim.34 Man’s inclination to become socialized and his propensity 
to isolate himself by means either of resisting the will of the others 
or neglecting their freedom and dignity, are both egoistic inclina-
tions: nothing but two sides of the same “self-interest”35 that guides 
human actions. Man’s instinct to enter in a society does not obey, 
according to Kant, to a kind of natural wisdom or moral sense that 
individuals have. Furthermore, morality is rather an historical effect 
of social antagonism.36 Besides, contrary to Montaigne’s moralizing 
platitude, Kant’s concept of social unsociability excuses individu-
als from any kind of guilt or punishment, since according to Kant, 
individuals actually do not know what they are doing nor pursuing 
through their deeds, so they cannot be imputable at all. Moreover, 
the genus proximum in Kant’s defi nition of the social antagonism in 
the fourth proposition puts it very clearly: social unsociability is a 
means of nature not of man. Last but not least, Kant does not com-
plain about these egoistic inclinations, precisely on the contrary, he 
31. ZeF, AA 08:360, 368, see also AA 12:10 (Kant’s letter to Schiller dated on 30 
March 1795).
32. ZeF, AA 08:368; Anthr, AA 09:330-333.
33. M. E. DE MONTAIGNE, The Complete Essays, transl. by M. A. Screech (Penguin 
Books, London, 1991) 267, quoted from IUH 13 n. a.
34. IUH 13 (IaG, AA 08:20).
35. TPP 92 (ZeF, AA 08:368).
36. IUH 14 (IaG, AA 08:21); ZeF AA 08:366.
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praises them by considering the motor of history, rather than an 
evil, and, consequently, the cause of “all culture and art that adorn 
humanity, and [of] the most beautiful social order.”37
Kant’s praise of Nature is more than a rhetorical gesture, for 
it expresses his conviction that without this antagonism humanity 
would not have any historical progress at all:
Without these qualities of unsociability from which the resist-
ance arises, which are not amiable in themselves, qualities that 
each of us must necessarily encounter in his selfi sh pretensions, 
all talents would, in an arcadian pastoral life of perfect con-
cord, contentment and mutual love, remain eternally hidden in 
their germs; human beings, as good-natured as the sheep they 
tended, would give their existence hardly any greater worth 
than that of their domesticated beasts; they would not fi ll the 
void in creation in regard to their end as rational nature.38
Since this antagonism is a means of nature and not of man, the fact 
that without confl ict there would neither be progress nor history 
is not due to man’s freedom but to nature’s coercion. The human 
being, according to Kant, “wills concord; but nature knows better 
what is good for his species: it wills discord.”39 In 1795, Kant ex-
presses the same idea in the following terms:
When I say that nature wills that this or that ought to happen, 
I do not mean that she imposes a duty upon us to act thus (for 
this can only be done by practical reason acting free of compul-
sion), but rather that she does it herself, regardless of whether 
we will it so or not (fata volentem ducunt, nolentem trahunt).40
Individual freedom, according to Kant, is irrelevant for understand-
ing the history of humanity, since for the historical progress of hu-
37. IUH 15 (IaG, AA 08:22). See also IaG, AA 08:21 and ZeF, AA 08:366.
38. IUH 14 (IaG, AA 08:21).
39. Ibidem.
40. TPP 90 (ZeF, AA 08:365).
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manity toward perpetual peace it is not necessary that individuals 
know nor will what they actually are accomplishing for human pro-
gress. The desires, demands, goals, dreams, welfare and happiness of 
individuals have no relevance at all in the plan nature has designed,41 
since, as we can read at the beginning of the second proposition of 
Kant’s 1784 article, the subject of history is actually the species, 
humanity.42 “The role of the human being”, Kant must confess, “is 
thus very artifi cial.”43
Humanity, as the very subject of history, progresses, according 
to Kant, in a dialectical way. It does not only transit the negativity 
of amorality (war and oppression, for instance) in order to make 
morality possible and then real,44 but it also needs to go through 
the negativity of confl icts (state of nature, intrastate and interna-
tional wars, economic competition among states) in order to reach 
the crisis needed (a political revolution, a change of the national or 
international economic paradigm) for advancing to the next step in 
this progress toward perpetual peace. Kant’s conception of war in 
relation to the idea of perpetual peace illustrates the dynamics of 
history progress:
All wars are therefore only so many attempts (not, to be sure, 
in the aims of human beings, buy yet in the aim of nature) 
to bring about new relationships between states, and through 
destruction or at least dismemberment of all of them to form 
new bodies, which, however, once again cannot preserve them-
selves either in themselves or next to another and hence must 
suffer new, similar revolutions until fi nally, partly through the 
best possible agreement of their civil constitution internally, 
partly through a common agreement and legislation externally, 
a condition [Zustand] is set up, which, resembling a civil com-
monwealth, can preserve itself like an automaton.45
41. IUH 11-12/AA 08:18-20.
42. IaG, AA 08:18.
43. IUH 16 n. (IaG, AA 08:23n.).
44. See, for instance, IaG, AA 08:21 and ZeF, AA 08:366.
45. IUH 17 (IaG, AA 08:24-25), see also the same dialectic dynamics in Kant’s 
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In doing so, humanity is following the laws of nature mechanism, 
more specifi cally of the antagonism inherent to human nature. In 
this regard, the establishment of a federation of states and the pro-
motion and the growth of international trade must not be merely 
understood as Kant’s view on politics and economy, but rather as 
new, higher and more civilized forms of the original social unso-
ciability. Given the fact that the antagonism is inherent to human 
nature, this antagonism cannot disappear, since without social un-
sociability there would not be human race as such on earth, but 
merely one more species of domesticated beasts. Hence, each new 
form of antagonism does not cancel the antagonism, but gives to 
the social unsociability a more complex structure that as such ena-
bles a broader and safer space for exerting freedom by means of 
reciprocally restricting the original “brute freedom” of human be-
ings.46 This restriction occurs in all levels of human historicity and 
essentially consists of the creation of more complex interdepend-
ence relationships among the elements of each dimension of human 
life. Progress is achieved, for instance, through the restrictions to 
individual absolute freedom by means of civil laws within the state. 
These restrictions transform the individual to a citizen, which is a 
more complex determination of man and implies that each act of the 
individual depends on the acts of the others. By becoming a mem-
ber of a federation of states, a nation-state restricts its own brute 
freedom and conditions its own actions and the actions of the other 
states at the same time within the legal framework of international 
law and agreements. The restriction in all cases is horizontal and 
vertical: horizontal in regard to the other members of the respec-
tive totality (civil society, the international community), vertical in 
regard to the law and agreements that regulate these totalities.
The impossibility of totally repressing human antagonism is 
based on Kant’s idea that this antagonism is the motor of histori-
cal progress of humanity. Without a certain level of confl ict there 
formulation of nature’s arrangements for guaranteeing progress toward perpetual 
peace in ZeF, AA 08:363.
46. IUH 17 (IaG AA 08:24).
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would not be any progress. For instance, in the most satisfactory 
situation of peace, Kant observes, danger must not be totally neu-
tralized, but it must remain latent, because otherwise “the powers 
of humanity” would “fall asleep.”47
In Kant’s description of human progress toward more and 
more complex structures and dynamics of social unsociality interna-
tional trade is presented as the highest form of reciprocal restriction 
of freedom and interdependence.48 The spirit of trade makes cer-
tainly war impossible, but far from meaning the end of all confl icts, 
the spirit of trade is nothing but a more sophisticated and effi cient 
form of social antagonism. Kant’s apology of “the spirit of trade” 
and the “power of money” is, therefore, not an economic statement, 
but an encouraging claim about human destination, based on the ac-
ceptation that human antagonism and egoistic inclinations are not 
only essential to our nature, but also more primordial than morality. 
This is the reason why Kant’s proposal for a political praxis toward 
perpetual does not consist of neglecting or condemning the social 
unsociability, but rather of elaborating a strategy for administrating 
this antagonism as effi ciently as possible.
2. FICHTE: REPRESSING NATURE AS THE ONLY EFFECTIVE 
MEANS TOWARDS PERPETUAL PEACE
In 1796, Fichte writes a review of Kant’s “Toward Perpetual Peace” 
for Niethammer’s “Philosophical Journal of a Society of German 
Scholars”. Fichte’s review almost literally recaps the content of the 
preliminary and the defi nitive articles and of the fi rst supplement 
concerning the guarantee of perpetual peace. Since the review is on 
the fi rst edition of Kant’s essay, there is no mention of the second 
supplement, which is an addition of the second edition of this essay 
in 1796. About the two sections of the appendix on the relationship 
between morality and politics with respect to perpetual peace Fichte 
47. IUH 18 (IaG, AA 08:26).
48. IaG, AA 08:27-28 and ZeF, AA 08:368.
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merely says that it contains some “truths accurately said.”49 Only 
concerning two points of Kant’s 1795 essay Fichte thinks it neces-
sary to offer his own view: the separation of powers in a republic50 
and the regulative idea of nature’s wisdom guiding and administrat-
ing the egoistic inclinations of the individuals in order to progress 
towards perpetual peace.
Although Fichte does not say it explicitly, his own view on 
these issues expresses actually a criticism against Kant.51 The analy-
sis of Fichte’s fi rst criticism, which entails Fichte’s proposal of the 
ephorate, an institution that must control the executive power, falls 
outside of the scope of the present analysis. The second one, on the 
contrary, is relevant for the present paper, since it illustrates the es-
sential divergence between Kant and Fichte concerning the role of 
nature, and consequently of the social unsociability as well, in the 
historical progress toward perpetual peace.
Unlike Kant, Fichte is skeptical about the alleged effi ciency of 
what I have called the Kantian formula providentia sive natura. Kant’s 
“Perpetual Peace” has not convinced Fichte that self-interest and 
the spirit of trade really serve for perpetual peace or, better, that 
they necessarily lead humanity to its fi nal goal. Fichte suggests that 
self-interest left to itself does not produce a situation favorable for 
the establishment of a republican rule of law nor of peaceful inter-
national relations among the states.
It sounds obvious, Fichte observes, that men should always 
choose for a national constitution according with reasonable laws, 
since such a political order guarantees that all citizens can pur-
sue their own egoistic aims by means of reciprocal restriction of 
their original freedom. However, Fichte adds, they do not act as 
expected: they support and strengthen through their deeds the 
existent unjust situation. Fichte must conclude that the only way 
49. RezPP, GA I/3, 228.
50. RezPP, GA I/3, 225-226.
51. In the third section of the Introduction to his Foundations of Natural Law according 
the Principles of the Doctrine of Science, Fichte offers again a commentary on Kant’s 
Perpetual Peace. This time, however, he only concentrates on the fi rst of his 
criticisms against Kant, namely on the necessity of the ephorate (GA I/3, 326-328).
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of explaining this social behavior against social, political and eco-
nomic justice and equality is by presupposing that “the advantages 
of disorder must be stronger than the advantages of order.”52 Not 
only the ones who win with disorder and inequality, actively and 
consciously sustain such an unjust political situation, but also the 
others, who suffer the negative consequences of this system, do the 
same, since, according to Fichte, they hope that one day they also 
will enjoy these advantages, which, as all actors involved in this po-
litical drama know, are based on legal disorder, economic inequality 
and social and political oppression. The Kantian unsocial sociabil-
ity does not seem, in Fichte’s view, to open the way for humanity 
to global justice and equality.
Fichte’s criticism goes directly against Kant’s thesis that the 
antagonist mechanism of nature constantly and unavoidably gener-
ates crises that results in higher (more civilized) forms of unsocial 
sociability. Against this antagonism, the human being, Kant sug-
gests, cannot do anything but, following the example of wise nature, 
trying to administrate it by creating new restrictions and, conse-
quently, new interdependence links between citizens and states. In 
Kant’s philosophy of history, progress toward perpetual is guaran-
teed by the impossibility of stopping the antagonism, which is es-
sentially the motor of human historical progress. Fichte objects the 
Kantian dialectics in history, since he does not agree with Kant in 
the assumption that justice and equality historically are a product of 
nature, namely an outcome of the egoistic inclinations of the indi-
viduals and the states. Moreover, Fichte suggest that reality provides 
enough evidence that a certain intensity of oppression—a level of 
oppression that let everyone hope that he or she one day will be at 
the side of the winners of the unjust system—makes any kind of 
revolution impossible, since individuals seem to be satisfi ed in such 
a situation. Hence, they would not undertake any action—neither 
forced by nature nor inspired by moral sentiments—for changing 
the political and economic paradigm.53
52. RezPP, GA I/3, 227.
53. RezPP, GA I/3, 227-228.
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Fichte’s criticism goes, however, even further: it does not only 
concern Kant’s diagnosis and prognosis on human historical pro-
gress toward perpetual peace, but also the proposal for a rational 
intervention in history. Fichte suggests that the real solution to so-
cial, political and economic injustice does not consist of strengthen-
ing confl ict and competitiveness in order to provoke political and 
economic revolutions, but in cancelling its very source, namely: na-
ture as it is expressed in the Kantian unsocial sociability.54 Hence, 
Fichte’s solution adopts the form of a set of ascetic practices towards 
self-control and/or domination of the source of evil in human na-
ture. Montaigne’s duality in man that Kant objected, is now essen-
tial to the Fichtean account on the progress toward perpetual peace. 
Fichte’s argument is very simple: a domestic rule of law as well as 
an international legal order according to the principles of reason 
can only be achieved, if citizens and political leaders control their 
supreme vice, namely that “obsession for robbery [Raubsucht]” that 
characterizes human nature55 and is the real cause of war.
According to Fichte, nature in man refers to that side of human 
duality that has to be neutralized. The body of the rational being, 
Fichte observes, is also a manifestation of that “Not-I”, which the 
I is destined to totally conquer or even destroy.56 Fichte defi nes 
the goal of humanity in history as the “common cultivation of the 
pure human being.”57 For achieving this goal there are according to 
Fichte three steps, which man has to accomplish: fi rstly, the creation 
of a pure moral and religious community, secondly the establish-
ment of an absolute state of law on domestic and international lev-
els, and, thirdly, the total dominance of nature under the authority 
of rational will.58 For Fichte, nature has always the negative conno-
tation of being an impediment for human progress. The only way 
54. In this regard, Nakhimovsky’s claim that “Fichte’s new approach to the problem 
of perpetual peace was based on the same theory of unsocial sociability as Kant’s” 
neglects the profund divergences between both philosophers (I. NAKHIMOVSKY, 
op. cit., 47).
55. RezPP, GA I/3, 228.
56. GA I/3, 28-30 (Über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten, 1794).
57. GA I/8, 431 (Philosophy of Freemasonry. Letters to Konstant, 1802).
58. GA I/8, 440 (Philosophy of Freemasonry. Letters to Konstant, 1802).
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for integrating nature in human progress consists of considering it 
as the material for human action. Nature is that negativity without 
which the ceaseless striving of I and the absolute character of the 
imperative of practical reason could not be explained.59 So, Fichte 
cannot follow Kant in both ascribing wisdom to nature and identi-
fying this sagacious nature with providence. Nevertheless, there is, 
according to Fichte, certainly a plan for humanity and this plan has 
been designed by a non-human intelligence, but whereas Kant calls 
this intelligence nature, Fichte calls it God, a name that for Fichte 
exclusively means the personifi cation of the moral law.60
In the Fichtean account, nature, left to itself, only produces 
inequality: the differences of classes are a product of the individual 
natural capacities of human beings and these differences can only, 
and ought to, be remedied by freedom.61 Nature, Fichte affi rms, has 
nothing to do with human history, since progress is a process that 
takes exclusively place in the spiritual element of human duality. 
Neither nature as such nor nature in man progresses, only the spirit 
progresses and progress is for Fichte only moral progress.62 Nature, 
in Fichte’s view, is not anymore involved in any decision making 
concerning the destination of humanity.
In this new conceptual context, the will and the freedom of 
both the states and their citizens recovers the relevance that Kant’s 
philosophy of history systematically neglected. The aim of the state 
(not of nature), according to Fichte, is to bring the citizens to a con-
sciously deliberated renounce to the natural inclination of possessing 
everything.63 Hence, the progress of humanity towards national and 
global justice needs that citizens know what kind of goal they have 
to pursue. Hence, morality is for Fichte not a result of an amoral 
or immoral mechanism of historical progress, but it is situated at 
the very beginning of his conception of human progress. Unlike 
59. GA I/2, 396 n. (Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge, 1794/95).
60. GA I/5 247 (On the Basis of our Belief in a Divine Governance of the World, 1798).
61. GA I/3, 42-50 (On the Destination of Scholars, 1794).
62. GA II/9, 145 (Manuscript of Fichte’s 1805 Logic course at the University of 
Erlangen).
63. RezPP, GA I/3, 228.
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Kant, Fichte suggests that individuals’ ignorance must necessar-
ily be attacked, since without the knowledge about the destination 
of humanity, there is no human progress in history. Despite the 
similarities between Kant and Fichte’s accounts on morality, both 
philosophers differ in their view on morality’s extension of validity. 
Whereas Kant excludes the primacy of practical reason from his 
philosophy of history towards perpetual peace,64 Fichte’s concept of 
human progress does not make any concession to any benefi t that 
could spring forth from amoral or immoral human acts.
Kant and Fichte’s views on war in relation to perpetual peace 
crystal clearly illustrate this disagreement. Both accept the unavoid-
ability of war, but whereas Kant reinforces its necessity by giving it 
a positive function in human progress, Fichte considers war in itself 
as something accidental that actually should not happen. Moreover, 
since for Fichte there is no nature acting as providence, individuals 
and states are totally responsible of their acts. This is the reason, I 
would like to suggest, why Fichte has some complications in justify-
ing that kind of war that is required in his protectionist theory for 
achieving the closing of the commercial state: military occupation as 
a means of the state in order to defi nitively establish its own borders 
before it proceeds to the closing of all its international commercial 
relations.65 Unlike Kant, for whom the aims of the states that wage 
war, are not relevant for cosmopolitan history, since ignorance is 
compensated by nature’s wisdom, Fichte can only tolerate war, if it 
is deliberately waged in order to bring humanity closer to a situation 
of perpetual peace, namely if it attempts at putting an end to the 
“robbery obsession”66 on the level of international relations.
Fichte’s proposal of collective renounce to egoistic inclinations 
can be achieved in civil society, when a nation has reached an “equi-
librium of possessions”, namely: an economic situation that every-
one, the lower and the higher classes, can tolerate. This equilibrium 
can only come about through the deliberate and active intervention 
64. See G. CAVALLAR, Cosmopolitanisms in Kant’s philosophy, “Ethics & Global Politics” 
5/2 (2012) 96-97 and 106.
65. GHS, GA I/7, 134-135.
66. RezPP, GA I/3, 228.
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of the rational being in history. According to Fichte, inequality and 
injustice must be attacked by means of global increasing of pro-
duction of goods, increasing of population and (re-)distribution of 
wealth. Once this situation of economic equality is established on 
national and international levels, Fichte concludes, there will be no 
need for international trade nor slavery.67 In the Kantian account, 
free world trade or free market economy is crucial for the develop-
ment of the real conditions of possibility for legal cosmopolitanism. 
Kant understands free world trade as the highest and more effi cient 
manifestation of the antagonism in relation to perpetual peace, since 
it makes war almost impossible and compels the states to establish 
more rational political institutions as well as to protect the freedom 
of their citizens.68 According to Fichte, perpetual peace, which is 
“the only rightful relation among States,”69 can be reached, on the 
contrary, only if we actually proceed in the opposite way, namely: 
obstructing and impeding free market. This is the conclusion of his 
protectionist treatise on Political Economy The Closed Commercial 
State,70 the principles of which Fichte already sketched in his review 
of the Kantian 1795 essay.
Concerning international trade in relation to perpetual peace, 
the differences between Kant and Fichte are still deeper. In his The 
Closed Commercial State Fichte offers a draft of a history of trade, in 
which international trade, contrary to Kant’s view, is not presented 
as the future but as the past of human history. Progress is not free 
trade, but protectionism, Fichte affi rms. Fichte argues that the po-
litical development of Europe into a diversity of nation-states has 
not yet been accompanied by a similar economic progress consist-
ing of the creation of a diversity of closed commercial states. Like 
the “One Nation” that Christian Europe incarnated, free market 
economy is for Fichte a thing of the past, something that has been 
adopted without testing it71 and accepted only because of tradition 
67. Ibidem.
68. IaG, AA 08:27, see also ZeF, AA 08:367.
69. GA I/4, 162 (Foundations of Natural Law, 1796/97).
70. GHS, GA I/7, 119, 138 and 141.
71. GHS, GA I/7, 95.
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and conventions. Defending free international trade is for Fichte a 
dogmatic view of economy that contradicts the spirit of the Enlight-
enment. Hence, the economic system in Europe must develop in the 
same direction of political development, namely it must follow the 
development of State and Law-systems.
For Fichte, free international trade is not only a living anach-
ronism, but also a situation of anarchy in the international relations 
that must be solved in order to guarantee peace.72 Contrary to Kant, 
for whom free international trade is the best antidote, even better 
than cosmopolitan law, against human propensity to war; Fichte 
thinks of the relation between war and free international trade pre-
cisely in opposite terms: free trade economy is not a sublimation 
or more civilized form of the unsocial sociability present in war, 
but the very cause of war. Free international trade, Fichte affi rms 
paraphrasing Hobbes, provokes “an endless commercial war of all 
against all.”73 Whereas in the Kantian account free international 
trade makes any declaration of war almost impossible, because of the 
complex chains of interdependence it creates, for Fichte free mar-
ket stimulates war, because it is the source of poverty, unhappiness, 
misery and domestic and international political crisis.74
Against the anarchy of international trade, which, according 
to Fichte, is essentially a latent threat for the historical progress of 
humanity toward perpetual peace, Fichte proposes the dissolution of 
international trade, which basically consists, as everyone knows, of 
state’s economic isolation. Fichte’s closing of the commercial state 
is, therefore, more than a political issue, since what his theory wants 
to cancel is not merely an economic system, but rather a moral issue: 
the egoism of man. Hence, Fichte’s political economic program pre-
supposes a cultural revolution based on radical changes of customs, 
habits and even of taste. His protectionist proposal demands that 
individuals have to learn a new way of enjoying and having pleasure 
as well.75 The fundamental idea of his protectionist program is not 
72. GHS, GA I/7, 92 and 95.
73. GHS, GA I/7, 98.
74. GHS, GA I/7, 99, 106-107, 110-111.
75. GHS, GA I/7, 116.
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only that human progress implies the total extirpation of unsocial 
sociability from earth,76 but fi rst and foremost that social unsocia-
bility can and must be extirpated from human nature. According to 
Fichte, social unsociability is not the real motor of human progress.
At the end of both his Review on Kant’s Perpetual Peace and The 
Closed Commercial State, Fichte suggests that perpetual peace is not 
only more than “a pious wish,”77 but also than a mere regulative 
idea, since he does not situate the economic and political realization 
that this idea demands in an impossible future, but in a far but still 
possible future.78 According to Fichte, a situation of perpetual peace 
can be achieved, as soon as all nations establish a rule of law and 
an economic system that according to rational principles guarantee 
social, political and economic justice and equality, in other words: as 
soon as the protectionism that Fichte proposes, becomes global. At 
the end of his 1800 political economy treatise, Fichte describes this 
globalization process as a kind of domino effect or positive conta-
gious effect: fi rstly, this political and economic system is established 
in one country; then, its success attracts the attention and interest of 
other countries that follow the example; in doing so, Fichte’s pro-
tectionism extends little by little all over the world until this system 
becomes the universal rule and perpetual peace becomes a reality.79
According to Fichte, the global community that represents the 
ideal of perpetual peace is not structured by political and economic 
interdependence connections, but, on the contrary, it consists of a 
totality composed by isolated parts. The effective reality of the cos-
mopolitan ideal of perpetual peace reveals itself as the reverse of the 
usual notion of cosmopolitanism. Moreover, Fichte suggests that the 
implementation of his protectionism, which is essential for achieving 
perpetual peace, results in the reinforcement of patriotic love.80
The only communication bridges among the states that Fichte 
allows concerns scientifi c and artistic cooperation. In doing so, 
76. GHS, GA I/7, 118.
77. RezPP, GA I/3, 221.
78. RezPP, GA I/3, 228 and GHS, GA I/7, 141.
79. GHS, GA I/7, 139 and 141.
80. GHS, GA I/7, 139.
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Fichte remains faithful not only to his conviction that real cosmo-
politanism is only achieved in the global community that spiritually 
gathers all rational beings, because true intersubjectivity consists ex-
clusively of knowledge exchange,81 but also to his nature-neglecting 
maxim that “there is no world other than the moral world.”82
3. SOME REMARKS AS A CONCLUSION
The offered comparative analysis shows that Kant and Fichte’s di-
vergence in conceiving nature in relation to perpetual peace and 
human progress is at the basis of all the differences between Kant 
and Fichte’s notions of perpetual peace and related concepts such as 
cosmopolitanism, global justice and equality, war and international 
trade. Unlike Kant, who develops a special concept of nature for his 
cosmopolitan philosophy of history—i.e. nature as providence—, 
Fichte’s cosmopolitanism applies the same concept of nature of his 
Science of Knowledge.
Like Kant, Fichte considers perpetual peace as both the last 
goal of international politics and the regulative idea for establish-
ing a rational constitution in a nation-state. Nevertheless, Fichte’s 
version of perpetual peace differs from Kant’s proposal in the reali-
zation. According to Fichte, perpetual peace can only be achieved 
by a radical protectionism that implies the cancellation of almost 
all kinds of international relations. As already shown, Fichte seems 
to have no confi dence in the cunning of nature nor in the spirit of 
trade and the power of money, the effi ciency of which in relation to 
perpetual peace Kant thought to have discovered. Fichte’s proposal 
for a political praxis towards perpetual peace reveals itself as an anti-
natural move: neutralization or sublimation of desire.
Perpetual peace appears in Fichte’s account as the necessary 
consequence of the universalization of his protectionist political 
economical proposal. We can reconstruct Fichte’s argument as it 
81. See, for instance, GA I/2, 89 (On the Dignity of Man, 1794), GA I/3, 41 (On the 
Destination of the Scholar, 1794) and GA I/3, 348 (Fundations of Natural Law, 
1796/97).
82. GA II/12, 118 (Die Tatsachen des Bewusstseyns, 1810/11).
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follows: the only way for making war impossible consists of making 
economic competition among nation-states impossible, since war is 
originated by economic interests. On the contrary, Kant’s hope that 
humanity is progressing toward perpetual peace rests in the state-
ment that international trade makes war impossible.
The Kantian “spirit of trade” appears within the Fichtean con-
ception of human progress as one of the forms of the mentioned 
“obsession for robbery”. This egoistic inclination that Kant consid-
ers the most benefi cial for peaceful international order, is what, in 
the Fichtean account, has to be attacked. According to Fichte, hu-
manity has to produce a new social and economic order, that makes 
uninteresting or superfl uous the idea of world economic hegemony. 
Contrary to Kant, whose proposal mainly rests upon the acceptation 
of the impossibility of cancelling human social unsociability, Fichte 
thinks that human antagonism is accidental and can therefore be 
extirpated from earth. This is the reason why Fichte claims that a 
moral cosmopolitan consciousness is needed for the transformation 
of the world, whereas morality and human knowledge or wisdom 
do not play any determinant role in Kant’s cosmopolitan view on 
human historical progress.
Last but not least, both accounts on perpetual peace offers two 
different forms of understanding global community as a totality. 
Kant connects the third category of each group of his table of the 
pure concepts of the understanding: totality, limitation, commu-
nity as reciprocal effect and necessity.83 His notion of global com-
munity consists of a complex network of political and economic 
interdependence that necessarily results from ceaseless reciprocal 
limitation of freedom. Fichte’s perpetual peace, for his part, offers a 
totality that must renounce to the moment of the relation category, 
since only the isolation of the parts can constitute the whole that a 
peaceful global community represents in his account.
83. KrV B 106.
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